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1. Introduction
The decision of shareholders of public rms to accept a takeover o¤er is typically marred by
two problems. First, shareholders generally do not have a precise estimate of the fair value of
their shares, and without more information they cannot distinguish between inadequate and
attractive o¤ers. Second, the takeover succeeds only if the majority of target shareholders
approve it. As noted by Grossman and Hart (1980), unless shareholders can coordinate their
collective decision, there is a free rider problem when shareholders decide whether to accept a
tender o¤er.1 Overall, there is a risk that the outcome of the takeover is ine¢ cient.
To assist target shareholders, the board of directors is expected to use its superior knowledge
about the company and advise shareholders whether accepting the takeover o¤er is in their best
interests. Indeed, most takeover attempts are accompanied by a public recommendation from
the target board to its shareholders.2 For example, in response to a multi-billion takeover o¤er
from Kraft Foods, the board of Cadbury published a defence document in which it explains why
shareholders should follow its recommendation to reject Krafts o¤er.3 Target shareholders,
however, do not always follow these recommendations, perhaps because they do not trust their
board. After being pressured by its shareholders, the board of Cadbury eventually accepted
a sweetened bid from Kraft Foods, even though the bid was below what was suggested by
Cadburys CEO as a fair value for the company.4 Baker and Savasoglu (2002) study 1901 US
takeover o¤ers between 1981 and 1996, and nd that around 20% of the o¤ers either succeeded
despite the resistance of the target board, or failed in spite of the boards support.5
The evidence suggests that the ability of the target board to sway the collective decision of
its shareholders varies across rms. What determines whether target shareholders listen and
follow the recommendations of their board? Is it necessarily in their best interests to have an
1Rossi and Volpin (2004) nd evidence that is consistent with the free-rider hypothesis.
2SEC rule 14d-9 requires the target board to post a recommendation in response to a tender o¤er in the US.
3See http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/CadburyDefenceDocument2009-part1.pdf
4See How Cadburys resolve melted when the price was right, The Guardian, 01/18/2010.
5See also Bange and Mazzeo (2004), Cotter and Zenner (1994), Cotter et al. (1997), Schwert (2000),
Shivdasani (1993), Song and Walkling (1993).
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inuential board? How does the market react to these recommendations? Does a failure to
inuence shareholdersdecision indicate that the board had no e¤ect on the outcome of the
takeover? How should corporate boards be structured given their advisory role in takeovers?
The goal of this paper is to explore these important questions, which to best of my knowledge
were overlooked by the existing literature.
For this purpose, I develop a model in which the takeover o¤er, the recommendation of the
target board, and the collective decision of target shareholders are all determined in equilibrium.
The bidder, who can increase the value of the target, makes a tender o¤er to acquire the rm.
Once the o¤er is made, the target board posts a public recommendation to shareholders,
advising them whether to accept or reject the o¤er. The board is not necessarily maximizing
shareholder value; it may have self-serving motives. However, the board has private information
about the value of the target. By its nature, this information is forward-looking and non-
veriable. Since the credibility of the board is the key in understanding its ability to inuence
the decision of shareholders, communication is modeled as cheap talk à la Crawford and Sobel
(1982). Given the recommendation of the board, each shareholder decides whether to accept
or reject the o¤er. The takeover is approved if and only if the majority of target shareholders
tender their shares. As in Grossman and Hart (1980), target shareholders cannot coordinate
their collective decision and they are subject to free-riding. If the initial o¤er is rejected by
shareholders, the bidder can revise it and make a best and nal o¤er. Target shareholders
then make their nal decision about the takeover.
In equilibrium, there is an interplay between the takeover premium that is o¤ered by the
bidder and the ability of the target board to inuence the decision of shareholders. If the
premium is su¢ ciently high (too low), the recommendation from the board is uninformative
and target shareholders accept (reject) the o¤er even if it is against their boards will. If
the premium is moderate, the success of the takeover is uncertain and depends on the
boards recommendation, which is informative. Building on this characterization, the analysis
provides novel predictions with respect to the likelihood that target shareholders ignore the
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recommendations of their board and the reaction of the market to these recommendations. The
analysis ties these variables to the type of the recommendation (accept or reject) and various
characteristics of the bidding rm (e.g., empire building motives or the ability to make a best
and nal o¤er), the independence and industry related expertise of target board members, and
the uncertainty about the value of target (e.g., target stock price informativeness or analysts
coverage).
Seemingly, if in equilibrium the recommendation is uninformative and ignored by sharehold-
ers, the target board must have had no e¤ect on the takeover. The analysis suggests otherwise.
The threat that the target board would alert its shareholders that an o¤er is inadequate can
in and of itself change the outcome of the takeover and deter the bidder from making a low
o¤er. For example, if the bidder has signicant private benets of control, he would be willing
to bid up the price to a point where in equilibrium target shareholders accept the o¤er even if
the board recommends them otherwise. In this light, the decision of Cadbury shareholders to
accept the o¤er from Kraft Foods in spite of their boards objection does not mean that the
Cadbury board was irrelevant the Kraft Foods o¤er might have been lower had the Cadbury
board not fullled its advisory role. On the other hand, by warning its shareholders that the
o¤er is inadequate the board creates adverse selection that is intensied by their free-riding be-
havior: Target shareholders accept the o¤er only if it is higher than the expected post-takeover
value of the target. Without signicant private benets of control, the bidder will try to avoid
overpaying for the target by low-balling the o¤er, and as a consequence, increasing the risk of
receiving a negative recommendation. At the extreme, the takeover premium in equilibrium
is too low and target shareholders reject the o¤er irrespective of what the board recommends
them to do. If the takeover is expected to increase value, following the advice of the board can
result with a lower expected target shareholder value in equilibrium.
The inuence of the target board in equilibrium depends on several factors. First, it
increases with the quality of the boards private information and the underlying uncertainty
about the target. In both cases, the board has more information to share with its shareholders,
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who are therefore willing to listen. Second, since a recommendation to reject the o¤er is a
signal that the target is undervalued, in equilibrium, the revised o¤er is always higher than
the initial o¤er. Therefore, the anticipation that the bidder will sweeten his initial o¤er gives
the target board more reasons to recommend shareholders against it. If the board is biased
against the takeover, the possibility of a bid revision exacerbates this bias and harms the
credibility of the board. However, if the board is biased in favour of the takeover, the possibility
of a bid revision counters this tendency and increases the inuence of the board. Third,
and perhaps surprisingly, the inuence of the board can increase with its bias against the
takeover. In particular, the model predicts a U-shape relationship between the independence
of the board and the likelihood that target shareholders ignore its recommendation to reject a
takeover o¤er. Intuitively, the objective of an unbiased board, which is to maximize the value
of shareholders as a collective, is di¤erent from the objective of each individual shareholder.
Indeed, due to free-riding, each shareholder has incentives to keep his share, hoping that other
shareholders would tender their shares and approve the takeover. As a result, shareholders
inevitably reject o¤ers that benet them collectively. A value-maximizing board distorts its
recommendation in an attempt to resolve this coordination failure: It misrepresents the value of
the target to convince shareholders that the o¤er is more attractive than it seems. Shareholders
anticipate this paternalism and do not take the recommendations of the board on their face
value. In equilibrium, these recommendations are contaminated with noise, and consequently,
shareholders limit the extent to which they follow the advice of their unbiased board.6 By
contrast, if the board is biased against the takeover, for example, because directors can lose
their job and the associated perks, it has weaker incentives to correct this coordination failure.
In fact, the board would exploit the tendency of shareholders to free-ride and recommend them
to reject some value-increasing o¤ers. If the resulting distortion from the self-serving motives
6Although the target board tries to overcome the free-riding problem, its impact is limited in equilibrium.
Studies by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), Cornelli and Li (2002), Kyle and Vila
(1991), Mueller and Panunzi (2004), Amihud et al. (2004), Marquez and Yilmaz (2012), At et al. (2011) and
Burkart et al. (1998), propose di¤erent ways to mitigate the free-riding problem.
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of the board is not too large, it coincides with shareholdersfree-riding behavior and reduces
the tension between the board and each individual shareholder. As a result, a biased board
has more credibility than a value-maximizing board in equilibrium.
The model provides a framework to study the reaction of the market to the recommenda-
tions of the target board. When the board resists the takeover, the reaction of the market in
equilibrium can be either negative or positive. If the reaction is negative then target share-
holders follow the recommendation of the board to reject the takeover even though the market
penalizes them for doing so. Indeed, because of the free-riding problem, shareholders cannot
avoid rejecting some o¤ers that benet them collectively. If the reaction of the market is
positive then the recommendation of the board to reject the takeover reveals that the o¤er
undervalues the target. The market therefore cheers the decision of target shareholders to
reject the o¤er. I show that the resistance of the target board is more likely to generate a
negative (rather than positive) market reaction in equilibrium when the target board is biased
against the takeover, the takeover is likely to generate high synergy or private benets for the
bidder, the o¤er is likely to be the bidders best and nal o¤er, or the target board is not
well informed relative to its shareholders.
The bias of the board (i.e., directors non-independence) and the quality of its private
information (i.e., directorsexpertise) play a key role in the analysis. The background, qual-
ications, and a¢ liation of directors, as well as the compensation they receive, a¤ect these
characteristics. What is the structure of the board that maximizes the expected target share-
holder value in equilibrium? I show several results. First, xing the independence of the board,
the optimal level of expertise is not necessarily the highest level of expertise. Second, xing
the expertise of the board, it is always optimal to have a board with an intrinsic bias against
selling the rm. Third, when both dimensions are endogenized, the optimal board is biased
against the takeover but has the highest level of expertise possible. All together, the model
suggests that in the context of takeovers, it is optimal to populate the board with directors
who are either employed by the rm or have social and business ties with senior manage-
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ment. These directors have access to management and are likely to be informed, but they also
have incentives to protect the CEO, and hence, are biased against the takeover. Moreover, I
show that in equilibrium under the optimal board structure (in all three congurations) target
shareholders accept the takeover o¤er irrespective of the recommendation of the board, which
is uninformative. In other words, the inability to inuence the decision of target shareholders
in equilibrium is a robust feature of an optimal board structure.7
Intuitively, the optimal board structure is designed to convince the bidder to make an
o¤er so high that shareholders cannot refuse, no matter what the board recommends them
to do. The subtlety is that the credibility of the optimal board has to be high enough to
deter the bidder from low-balling the o¤er, but it cannot be too high so that the bidder can
guarantee the success of the takeover by bidding-up the price. Since shareholders cannot
commit not to follow a highly informative recommendation, too much expertise on the board
can be counterproductive it exposes the bidder to adverse selection and forces him to shade
his o¤er. For a similar reason, the board has to be self-serving and su¢ ciently biased against
selling the rm so that shareholders do not always follow its advice. Interestingly, the expertise
and the bias of the board complement each other: Higher expertise increases the credibility
of the board and therefore requires a larger bias to keep the credibility xed. However, xing
the credibility of the board, a larger bias against the takeover forces the bidder to bid even
higher to avoid a negative recommendation. Following this logic, when both the bias and the
expertise of the board are designed, it is optimal to bias the board against the takeover and
set its expertise at the highest level.
Overall, the analysis emphasizes that in the context of takeovers, a biased board has sig-
nicant advantages that have been previously overlooked. This observation is consistent with
Bange and Mazzeo (2004) who nd that the takeover premium and the target shareholder
value are higher for targets with non-independent boards. Furthermore, the model predicts
7The result about the inability of the optimal board to inuence the decision of its shareholders is derived
in the context of takeovers. In practice, the optimal structure of the board and its behavior may also depend
on factors that are not related to takeovers (e.g., the investment policy of the rm), and therefore, are not
captured by the analysis in this paper.
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that if corporate boards are structured optimally (with respect to takeovers), takeover o¤ers
would embed a relatively high premium, these o¤ers are likely to be supported by the target
board (since the premium is abnormally high), but when the board is recommending against
the takeover, the target shareholders are likely to ignore these recommendations which are
uninformative.
This paper contributes to the literature on managerial resistance in takeovers (Bagnoli
et al. (1989), Baron (1983), Berkovitch and Khanna (1990), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990),
Harris and Raviv (1988), and Ofer and Thakor (1987)). Di¤erent from this literature, here
the target board cannot unilaterally block the takeover; it must convince target shareholders
that it is in their best interest to reject the o¤er. Since the ability of the board to resist a
takeover is endogenous, my framework can relate it to various characteristics of the acquirer
and the target. Models of takeovers with asymmetric information have been studied by Baron
(1983), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), Marquez and Yilmaz (2008, 2012), Ofer and Thakor
(1987), Ohta and Yee (2008), and Shleifer and Vishny (1986). Unlike these studies, here the
board of directors of the target rm is privately informed about the value of the target, and
it communicates this information strategically to inuence the decision of target shareholders.
To best of my knowledge, the role of corporate boards in advising their shareholders about
takeovers has not be addressed by the existing literature. Finally, the paper is related to
Adams and Ferreira (2007), Harris and Raviv (2008), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2012), and
Levit (2012), who study the trade-o¤between board independence and e¤ective communication
with the manager. Similar to these studies, I show that a biased advisory board can be better
than an unbiased advisory board from the perspective of uninformed shareholders. However,
instead of advising the manager, in this paper the board advises shareholders whether to accept
a takeover o¤er, which is one of the key duties of corporate boards. Because the takeover o¤er
is endogenous and a¤ected by the ability of the target board to inuence its shareholders,
the optimal board structure has a unique and surprising feature it cannot e¤ectively use its
private information to inuence the decision of shareholders in equilibrium.
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2. Setup
A public rm, the target, is owned by a continuum of homogeneous shareholders and run by
its board of directors. Each shareholder holds one non-divisible share and each share carries
one vote. The number of shares is normalized to one. According to the governance rules of the
rm, a successful takeover requires at least half of its voting rights. A bidder is considering the
acquisition of the rm. The value of the target rm under the control of the incumbent board
is eq which is uniformly distributed on [q; q], where 0  q < q. The di¤erence between q and q
measures the level of uncertainty about the standalone value of the target, which is a¤ected by
the availability of external sources of public information (e.g., target stock price, debt ratings,
or analyst coverage) or the volatility, intangibility, and complexity of the underlying assets of
the target. The standalone value of the target also captures the possibility that the target
remains independent for a while and then is acquired by a di¤erent bidder. The value of the
target rm under the control of the bidder is eq+, where  is common knowledge. Consistent
with the empirical evidence that takeovers on average create value (e.g., Andrade et al. (2001)
and Bhagat et al. (2005)), I assume   0. All players are risk neutral.
The game consists of ve stages. At the outset, the bidder makes an (initial) o¤er to target
shareholders. Following Grossman and Hart (1980), tender o¤ers are the only admissible mode
of takeovers. When making an o¤er, the bidder commits to buy all tendered shares conditional
on gaining control of the target, that is, at least half of the shareholders tendered their shares.
The focus is on conditional o¤ers, which are common in practice. An o¤er consists of a cash
payment that each shareholder receives in return for selling the bidder his share of the target
rm. I denote the initial o¤er by p1  0. If a shareholder decides to keep his share, he
retains exactly one share of the target under either management. In particular, the value to
non-controlling shareholders under the bidders control is given by eq + .8
8The assumption that non-tendering shareholders can hold onto their shares is not necessary. Alternatively,
the bidder can take the rm private and try to freeze-outnon-tendering shareholders. As long as nontendering
shareholders hold some bargaining power and expect to capture a fraction of the surplus, even if it is arbitrarily
small, collective action problems are present and the results of the paper continue to hold (see also Mueller and
Panunzi (2004) for a discussion on the fragility of freezeout mergers as a panacea to the free-riding problem).
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In the second stage, the board advises its shareholders about the takeover. The target
board is in a better position than its shareholders to estimate by how much the takeover o¤er
increases (or decreases) the value of their shares. Indeed, directors have superior information as
an integral part of their job, especially in the context of takeovers as the law requires directors
to inform themselves of all relevant information when evaluating a takeover proposal.9 To focus
attention on the advisory role of the board, I assume that the board privately observes signales on eq while target shareholders are uninformed. Bidders also have limited information about
the standalone value of the target and rely heavily upon its nancial statements. For those
reasons and for simplicity, I also assume that the bidder is uninformed about eq. The signal of
the board has the following properties:
es =
8><>:eq with probability  2 (0; 1]e" with probability 1  ; (1)
where e" and eq are identically and independently distributed. Parameter  measures the preci-
sion of the target boards private information. It can be interpreted as the level of expertise on
the board, which is a mix of the industry knowledge, experience, formal education, and talent
of its members.
To study the advisory role of the board, I assume that the only mean by which the board
can a¤ect the outcome of the takeover is by communicating private information to target
shareholders. Intuitively, although in some jurisdictions corporate boards can use defensive
measures such as poison pillsto resist a takeover, withstanding a pressure from shareholders
for a long period time is typically not feasible the board must persuade shareholders that
it acts in their best interests.10 The board, whose members are assumed to speak in one
Bates et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that is consistent with minority shareholders holding some
bargaining power in freezeout mergers.
9See the Delaware Supreme Courts decision in Smith vs. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
10In the UK, corporate boards cannot use poison pills unless shareholders explicitly approve them. In Canada,
poison pills can buy timefor the target board, but they cannot be used to block the takeover for an unlimited
period of time. In the US, poison pills have no expiration date. Empirically, Heron and Lie (2006) and Bates
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voice, recommends that shareholders either accept or reject the o¤er. The board can also be
more specic, for example, by providing its own estimate of the fairvalue of the target. In
the context of takeovers, the recommendations of the board are often based on the forecast
of future performances. By nature, this information is subjective and non-veriable. While
the board can back its recommendations with the opinions of investments bankers, these fair
opinionsoften rubber-stamp the view of directors and do not contain additional information
(Kisgen et al. (2009)). Moreover, disclosure of proprietary information such as trade secrets
or development of new technologies is often too costly and rare in practice. Consistent with
this view, the private information of the board is assumed to be non-veriable and the content
of the boards recommendation does not a¤ect its payo¤ directly. I denote by  (s; p1) 2 [q; q]
the message the board sends to target shareholders conditional on privately observing es = s
and given the bidders initial o¤er p1. I assume that the message is public.
In the third stage, shareholders simultaneously decide whether to tender their shares to
the bidder in return for p1. Each target shareholder is negligible in size and believes that
his individual decision cannot change the outcome of the takeover. Moreover, shareholders
do not rely on the recommendations of the board naively. They are aware of the possibility
that the board can manipulate information to a¤ect their decisions. Overall, the decision
of each shareholder to tender his share given initial o¤er p1 and message m is denoted by
1 (m; p1) 2 f0; 1g, where 1 = 1 stands for tendering and 1 = 0 for not tendering.
In the fourth stage, the bidder can revise his initial o¤er if it failed. Specically, if more
than 50% of target shareholders tendered their shares then the takeover succeeds, payo¤s are
distributed, and the game ends. However, if more than 50% of target shareholders rejected the
initial o¤er then with an exogenous probability  2 [0; 1) the bidder makes a new tender o¤er to
target shareholders, which can be higher than, identical to, or lower than the initial o¤er. With
probability 1  the bidder has to walk away from the deal and the target remains independent.
et al. (2008) nd that anti-takeover measures do not signicantly alter the likelihood that targets in contested
bid are ultimately acquired. See the Online Appendix for a characterization of the conditions under which
target shareholders benet from granting their board with the power to unilaterally reject the takeover.
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Parameter  captures in a reduced form the possibility that the bidders initial o¤er is also his
best and nal o¤er. Among other things, 1   reects the inability of the bidder to secure
additional funds that might be needed to raise the initial o¤er, the benet from establishing a
reputation for being a tough negotiator in the market for corporate control (which is relevant
for serial acquirers), the likelihood that an alternative and superior investment opportunity
emerges, or the inability to generate synergy if the acquisition of the target is delayed. I
denote the revised o¤er by p2 (m; p1).
Finally, if the initial tender o¤er is rejected by shareholders and then revised by the bidder,
similar to the third stage, target shareholders make their nal tendering decision and the game
ends. I denote by 2 (m; p1; p2) 2 f0; 1g the decision of each shareholder to tender his share
in return for the revised o¤er p2. Note that in the baseline model the board does not send
shareholders an additional message if the initial o¤er is revised. In Section 3.5 I consider a
variant of the model in which the board can also revise its initial recommendation.
2.1. Payo¤s
If the takeover fails, the value of each share is the realized value of eq. If an o¤er p is accepted,
each tendering shareholder gets p for his share, and each non-tendering shareholder obtains a
value of eq + . I denote the aggregate target shareholder value by ev. In equilibrium, ev is a
function of the realized standalone value of the target, the synergy, the tender o¤er, and the
number of shareholders who tendered their shares.
The possibility of a takeover can introduce conicts of interest between the target board
and its shareholders. The utility of the target board is given by
ew = ev +
8><>: if the takeover fails0 if the takeover succeeds. (2)
If  = 0 then the board is unbiased and its recommendations are given to maximize target
shareholder value. However, if  > 0 then the board is biased against selling the target and
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it may advise shareholders to reject o¤ers that increase value. A bias against the takeover
can arise if the takeover threatens directorscompensation, power, prestige, or rm-specic
human capital (Harford (2003)). Under this interpretation, higher  represents a board with
more insiders, fewer independent directors, and a more powerful CEO. Alternatively,  > 0
if directors represent other stakeholders whose wealth is negatively related to the success of a
takeover, for example, the labor force. By contrast, if  < 0 then the board is biased in favor of
selling the target and it may advise shareholders to accept o¤ers that undervalue the rm. For
example, an assurance by the bidding rm of continuity in directorspositions, or a promised
bonus upon successful transaction, can bias the board in favor of the takeover (Hartzell et al.
(2004)).
Finally, the bidder has a benet b  0 from the takeover that does not accrue to target
shareholders. Managers benet from acquisitions by gaining prestige from managing larger
rms, reducing exposure of idiosyncratic risk, consuming perks, obtaining higher compensation,
and reducing of the likelihood of a hostile takeover (Grinstein and Hribar (2004) and Harford
and Li (2007)). Therefore, bidding rms with a weaker corporate governance (e.g., rms
with dispersed shareholder base, low stock ownership by management, entrenched board, lack
of institutional ownership, etc.) will have larger private benets from acquiring the target.
Alternatively, private benets from control can stem from self-dealing with the target. Either
way, if the takeover succeeds then the bidder consumes his private benets b and earns eq+ p
on each of the tendered shares.11
2.2. Solution concept
A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game consists of ve parts: the bidders initial o¤er
p1, the communication strategy of the target board 
, shareholdersinitial tendering decision
1, the bidder revised o¤er p

2, and shareholdersnal tendering decision 

2. Specically, the
equilibrium is dened as follows: (i) For any message m and tendering stage i 2 f1; 2g, the
11The bidders private benets from control are exogenous and commonly known. See Burkart et al. (1998)
for a model with endogenous private benets.
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strategy i maximizes the expected utility of each shareholder given that other shareholders
are expected to follow i , taking as given 
 and pi . As standard in the literature on takeovers,
i is a symmetric pure-strategy and it cannot be weakly dominated.
12 Moreover, (ii) for any
p1 and realization of es, if message m is in the support of , then m maximizes the expected
utility of the board given 1, p

2, and 

2; (iii) the initial tender o¤er p

1 maximizes the bidders
expected prot given , 1, p

2, and 

2; (iv) for any message m, the revised o¤er p

2 maximizes
the bidders expected prot given  and 2. Finally, all agents have rational expectations in
that each players belief about the other playersstrategies is correct in equilibrium. Moreover,
all agents use Bayesrules to update their beliefs from the boards message about eq.
3. Analysis
Consider rst the collective decision of target shareholders to tender their shares. Let p be
tender o¤er made by the bidder and let q^ (m) be the beliefs of target shareholders about the
expected value of eq conditional on message m. Since the tender o¤er is conditional and no
shareholder is pivotal for the outcome, there always exists an equilibrium in which the tender
o¤er fails. This observation is a standard result in the literature on takeovers. It holds both
in the initial tendering stage as well as in the nal tendering stage, and it is independent of
the message of the board. However, if the tender o¤er is expected to succeed, each shareholder
compares the tender o¤er p to the value of his share under the new management, which is
given by q^ (m) + . If p  q^ (m) +  then tendering is a best response for each shareholder,
and if p < q^ (m) +  then each shareholder is better o¤ holding onto his share. As noted by
Grossman and Hart (1980), this free-riding behavior implies that value-increasing o¤ers can be
collectively rejected by shareholders. Hereafter, I focus on equilibria of the tendering stage in
which shareholders never play weakly dominated strategies. The next result summarizes the
conditions under which a given tender o¤er is accepted by shareholders.
12There are few exceptions in the literature: Bagnoli and Lipman (1988) and Hirshleifer and Titman (1990).
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Lemma 1 In any equilibrium of the tendering stage in which weakly dominated strategies are
not played, target shareholders accept the tender o¤er p given message m if and only if
p  q^ (m) + : (3)
According to Lemma 1, without more information, the lowest o¤er that shareholders accept
is q^ (m) + . Since the bidder shares the same beliefs with the shareholders about eq, if the
initial o¤er is rejected by shareholders and an opportunity to revise it has emerged (which
happens with probability ), the bidder revises his o¤er from p1 to q^ (m) + :
Lemma 2 Suppose the board sends message m with respect to initial o¤er p1. If the initial
o¤er is rejected by shareholders, then the revised o¤er is given by
p2 (m; p1) = q^ (m) + : (4)
Notice that since the bidder is uninformed about eq, the beliefs of target shareholders are
not a¤ected directly by his o¤er. However, the o¤er a¤ects the message that is sent by the
board, and through this channel, it indirectly a¤ects the shareholdersbeliefs and the revised
o¤er in equilibrium.
3.1. Boards recommendations
For any initial o¤er p1 there exists a proper subgame which I refer to as the communication
subgame. Consider the message of the board given p1. The message a¤ects the outcome
of the takeover if it reveals information about eq and either changes the tendering decision of
target shareholders (at either stage) or encourages the bidder to revise the initial o¤er if it is
rejected. Equilibria of the communication subgame with this property are called inuential.
Let M (p1) be the set of messages on the equilibrium path of the communication subgame.
The formal denition is given below.
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Denition 1 An equilibrium of the communication subgame is inuential if there exist m0 6=
m00 2M (p1) such that E [eqjm0] 6= E [eqjm00] and one of the following conditions hold:
(i) 1 (m
0; p1) 6= 1 (m00; p1).
(ii) 1 (m
0; p1) = 1 (m
00; p1) = 0, and p2 (m0; p1) 6= p2 (m00; p1) or 2 (m0; p1; p2 (m0; p1)) 6=
2 (m
00; p1; p2 (m00; p1)) :
The next result shows that an inuential equilibrium exists as long as the board can inu-
ence the collective decision of target shareholders with respect to the initial o¤er.13
Lemma 3 An equilibrium of the communication subgame is inuential if and only if there are
m0 6= m00 2M (p1) such that
q^ (m0) +   p1 < q^ (m00) + : (5)
Moreover, if  > 0 and the equilibrium is not inuential, then q^ (m0) = q^ (m00) for all m0 6=
m00 2M (p1).
According to Lemma 3, if the equilibrium is inuential then the message from the board
must be su¢ ciently informative to change the beliefs of target shareholders about the value of
the rm and the resulting decision. However, the message cannot be informative if it does not
a¤ect the collective decision of target shareholders, as prescribed by Lemma 1. Intuitively, one
might think that even if the message has no inuence on the decision of target shareholders,
it may still change the incentives of the bidder to revise the initial bid if it is rejected by
shareholders. In this case, however, the board would send the message that maximizes the
revised o¤er irrespective of its private information about the fundamental value of the target.
Understanding the incentives of the board to inate the revised o¤er, the bidder will ignore
this message, leaving the board with no inuence on the outcome of the takeover.
13All omitted proofs are given in the Appendix.
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Lemma 3 also implies that if the equilibrium is inuential then there are exactly two disjoint
sets of messages on the equilibrium path, MR (p1) and MA (p1), with distinctive properties. If
m 2 MA (p1) then q^ (m) +   p1 and 1 (m; p1) = 1. That is, shareholders tender their
shares and the takeover succeeds. Messages inMA (p1) can be interpreted as recommendations
to accept the initial o¤er p1. If m 2 MR (p1) then p1 < q^ (m) + , shareholders reject the
initial o¤er, the bidder revises the o¤er to q^ (m) +  if an opportunity to do so emerges, and
when it does, shareholders accept the revised o¤er. Messages in MR (p1) can be interpreted
as recommendations to reject the initial o¤er p1. The unique property of inuential equilibria
is that the board can inuence the decision of target shareholders. Note that both MR (p1)
and MA (p1) can have more than one message in equilibrium. Hereafter, I use the terminology
making a recommendation to describe the boards communication strategy and the term
the board is inuentialwhen the equilibrium of the communication subgame is inuential.
If the equilibrium is inuential then the expected payo¤ of the board conditional on es is
W (m; p1; es) =
8><>:p1 if m 2MA (p1) (q^ (m) + ) + (1  ) (E [eqjes] + ) if m 2MR (p1) : (6)
If  > 0 ( = 0) then conditional on recommending shareholders to reject the o¤er, the board
has strict (weak) incentives to send a message in arg maxm2MR(p1) q^ (m). Therefore, the board
recommends that shareholders accept the initial tender o¤er if and only if
p1  max
m2MR(p1)
(q^ (m) + ) + (1  ) (E [eqjes] + ) ; (7)
which means that in any inuential equilibrium there is a cuto¤ s such that m 2 MR (p1),es > s. If es = s then the board is indi¤erent between recommending shareholders to reject or
accept the takeover. Therefore, m 2MR (p1) implies q^ (m) = E [eqjes > s], and s must solve
p1 =  (s
) (8)
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where
 (x)   (E [eqjes > x] + ) + (1  ) (E [eqjes = x] + ) : (9)
Overall, the board recommends shareholders to accept o¤er p1 if and only if
 (es)  p1: (10)
Consistent with Bates and Becher (2016), the target board is more likely to oppose the deal
when the takeover premium is smaller.
The board is inuential only if both types of recommendations are on the equilibrium path,
that is, s 2 (q; q) which is equivalent to (q) < p1 < (q). In equilibrium, shareholders
correctly anticipate the communication strategy of the board and use it to estimate the value
of the target before they make a decision. Because of free-riding, shareholders follow the
recommendation of the board to accept the initial o¤er if and only if
E [eqj(es)  p1] +   p1: (11)
Similarly, shareholders follow the recommendation of the board to reject the initial o¤er if and
only if
p1 < E [eqj(es) > p1] + : (12)
According to Lemma 3, an inuential equilibrium of the communication subgame exists only
if both of these conditions are satised.
Proposition 1 Let p1 be the bidders initial tender o¤er. An inuential equilibrium of the
communication subgame exists if and only if (q) < p1 and p1 2 [(qL); (qH)) where
qL = q +
2

maxf0;      
1 
q q
2
g
qH = q +
2

min f0;  g :
(13)
(i) If the equilibrium is inuential, the board recommends shareholders to accept the initial
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tender o¤er if and only if (es)  p1. If the recommendation is to accept then shareholders
tender their shares and the bidder acquires the target. If the recommendation is to reject
then the initial o¤er fails. With probability  the bidder revises the initial o¤er to p2 =
E [eqj(es) > p1]+ and shareholders tender their shares. With probability 1  the bidder
withdraws his bid and the target remains independent.
(ii) If the equilibrium is not inuential, shareholders ignore the boards recommendation,
which is uninformative, and accept the initial o¤er if and only if E [eq] +   p1. If the
initial o¤er is rejected, then with probability  the bidder revises it to p2 = E [eq] +  and
shareholders tender their shares. With probability 1   the bidder withdraws his bid and
the target remains independent.
According to Proposition 1, if p1 2 [(qL); (qH)) (and (q) < p1) then there is an equi-
librium of the communication subgame in which shareholders follow the recommendations of
the board. In this equilibrium, the outcome of the takeover is uncertain and it depends on the
type of the recommendation that the board issues. By contrast, if p1 62 [(qL); (qH)) then no
equilibrium of the communication subgame is inuential, the outcome of the takeover does not
depend on the recommendation of the board, and at least one type of recommendation (accept
or reject) is ignored by shareholders. Specically, suppose that qL < qH , where qL and qH are
given by (13). It can be veried that qL < qH implies (qL) < E [eq] +  < (qH). Therefore,
if p1 < (qL) then shareholders ignore the boards recommendation to accept the o¤er, they
reject it, and the takeover fails unless the bidder revises his initial o¤er. If p1  (qH) then
shareholders ignore the boards recommendation to reject the o¤er, they accept it, and the
takeover succeeds.
The interval [(qL); (qH)) can measure the potential of the board to inuence the decision
of target shareholders. In particular, if qL  qH then this interval is empty and there is no
o¤er with respect to which the board is inuential.
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Corollary 1 Let qL and qH be as dened in (13). Then, qL < qH if and only if
 2 (   1
1  
q   q
2
; + 
q   q
2
): (14)
Moreover:
(i) (qH)  (qL) increases in  and q   q.
(ii) (qH)  (qL) increases in  if and only if  <    1 
q q
2
.
(iii) (qH)  (qL) increases in    if and only if    < 0.
Part (i) of Corollary 1 shows that the inuence of the board increases with the expertise of
the board and the uncertainty about the value of the target. These two measure the information
advantage the board has relative to its shareholders. The larger this information advantage
is, the more inuence the board can exert. Part (ii) shows that the inuence of the board can
increase with . In equilibrium, a recommendation to reject the o¤er is a signal that the value
of the target is higher than expected, and therefore, the bidder has a tendency to increase the
bid if it is initially rejected. As a result, the anticipation that the bidder will sweeten the initial
o¤er gives the target board more reasons to recommend shareholders to reject it. Therefore,
higher  can harm the credibility of the board. However, this intuition is correct only when
 is relatively large, that is, when the board has over-tendency to recommend shareholders to
reject the o¤er. When  is relatively small, the opposite is true. In these cases, the board
is inclined toward recommending the shareholders to accept the o¤er. Higher  counters this
tendency and thereby increases the credibility of the board.
Part (iii) of Corollary 1 and condition (14) show that the board can inuence its shareholders
in equilibrium only if its bias is moderate. If  is too large or too small, shareholders ignore
the board since they are concerned that its recommendations are primarily motivated by the
desire to protect its private benets/costs from obtaining control. Importantly, Corollary 1
demonstrates that a biased board can have more inuence in equilibrium than an unbiased
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board. Indeed, the size of the interval [(qL); (qH)), which measures the credibility of the
board, is increasing with  when  < . Since  > 0, a board with a bias  2 (0;) has
more inuence than an unbiased board ( = 0). Moreover, if 0     1
1 
q q
2
then condition
(14) requires  > 0. In this case, there is no o¤er with respect to which the unbiased board
is inuential. By contrast, if the board is biased against the takeover and its bias satises
condition (14), then there is a nontrivial set of o¤ers with respect to which the biased board
is inuential.
Why would shareholders ignore the unbiased board if its objective is to maximize their
value? The intuition is the following. If  = 0 then the objective of the board is to maximize
the value of shareholders as a collective. However, due to free-riding, this objective is di¤erent
from the objective of each individual shareholder. Because of these di¤erences, the board
has incentives to misstate its private information, and consequently, its private information is
never fully revealed in equilibrium. To see why, let  = 0 and suppose on the contrary that
in equilibrium the unbiased board fully reveals its information. That is, for every q^ 2 [q; q]
there is a unique message m (q^) such that, in equilibrium, the board sends message m (q^)
when eq = q^. Suppose eq = q^ where q^ 2 (p1   ; p1]. If the board sends message m(q^) then
shareholders believe that the standalone value of the target is q^. Since p1 < q^ + , according
to (3), each shareholder has incentives to keep his share, hoping that other shareholders would
tender their shares and approve the takeover. As a result, the takeover is rejected even though
shareholders are o¤ered a premium relative to standalone value of the target, i.e., q^  p1.
This is the free-rider problem. To convince shareholders to accept the o¤er, which clearly
benets them as a collective, the unbiased board pretends that the o¤er is more attractive
than it really is by falsely stating that eq +   p1. Specically, instead of sending message
m (q^) as the equilibrium prescribes, the board has incentives to deviate and send the message
m(q0) 6= m (q^) where q0 < q^ satises q0 +   p1. Therefore, the information of the unbiased
board is never fully revealed in equilibrium.
In equilibrium, the manipulation of the unbiased board is anticipated by shareholders, who
21
do not take its recommendations on their face value. As a result, these recommendations are
contaminated with noise and shareholders are less likely to follow them. A relatively small
(qH)  (qL) reects the low credibility of the unbiased board. Under certain conditions, the
credibility of the unbiased board is too low (e.g., when 0    1
1 
q q
2
) and shareholders refuse
to follow these recommendations altogether, that is, the interval [(qL); (qH)) is empty. This
argument illustrates that shareholdersfailure to coordinate their collective decision creates a
tension with the unbiased board, which harms its ability to e¤ectively advise them about the
takeover.14
Interestingly, a biased board can have more inuence than a value-maximizing (and unbi-
ased) board. If  = 0 then the biased board would like shareholders to accept the takeover
o¤er if and only if q^ +   p1. Therefore, similar to the arguments above, a biased board has
incentives to misrepresent its private information when q^ 2 (p1   ; p1   ]. If  2 (0;)
then this interval is smaller than (p1  ; p1], and in this respect, the incentives of the biased
board to manipulate are weaker. If  =  then the interval above is empty and the biased
board can fully reveal its information in equilibrium. Intuitively, the bias of the board can
relax the tension that is created by the collective action problem. When  > 0 the board has
self-serving reasons to keep the target independent, and in some cases, it recommends that
shareholders reject the takeover o¤er even if it provides a premium relative to standalone value
of the target. At the same time, shareholders free-ride each other, and thus, similar to the
biased board but for a di¤erent reason, they collectively reject value-increasing o¤ers. As long
as the bias of the board against the takeover is not too large, the preferences of the board are
e¤ectively closerto the objective of each shareholder individually, and consequently, a biased
board can exert more inuence than a value-maximizing board. Overall, the credibility of the
board, as measured by (qH)   (qL), obtains its maximum when  = . In this case, the
distortion from the free-riding behavior of target shareholders coincides with the self-serving
14This argument also holds with a nite number of shareholders. More generally, it is related to the idea
that externalities between group members can create incentives to manipulate information (e.g., Farrell and
Gibbons (1989), Dessí (2008), Hanson (2003) and Teoh (1997)).
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motives of their board.
Remark There always exists a non-inuential equilibrium of the communication subgame in
which the board randomizes between di¤erent messages, and the randomization is independent
of es. The existence of a babbling equilibrium is standard in the cheap talk literature. If
the conditions in Proposition 1 hold then the communication subgame has multiple equilibria:
one equilibrium in which the board is inuential and another equilibrium in which the board
is not inuential. Following the cheap talk literature, I assume that whenever an inuential
equilibrium of the communication subgame exists, this equilibrium is in play.15
3.2. Initial o¤er
The initial o¤er of the bidder depends on the type of recommendation that the board is expected
to issue and the response of target shareholders. If condition (14) is violated then regardless of
the o¤er, every equilibrium of the communication subgame is non-inuential, and the game is
played as if no communication between the board and the target shareholders is taking place.
Since target shareholders believe that the expected value of the rm under the bidders control
is E [eq] + , they accept the initial tender o¤er if and only if p1  E [eq] +  (as suggested by
Lemma 1). Moreover, since no information about eq is revealed, the option to revise the initial
o¤er has no e¤ect and the outcome is similar to Grossman and Hart (1980): The bidder o¤ers
p1 = E [eq] + , target shareholders accept the initial o¤er irrespective of the recommendation
of the board, and the takeover succeeds. However, if condition (14) holds then the ability of
the board to inuence the outcome of the takeover depends on the o¤er itself as described by
Proposition 1. The next result characterizes the equilibrium in those cases.
Proposition 2 Suppose condition (14) holds. There exist cuto¤s 0  b  b <1 such that in
equilibrium the following hold:
(i) If b 2 [0; b) then the bidder o¤ers p1 <  (qL), the board is not inuential, and target
15A previous version of the paper showed that similar results hold under di¤erent selections of equilibria.
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shareholders reject the initial o¤er irrespective of the boards recommendation.
(ii) If b 2 (b; b) then the bidder o¤ers p1 = (max fqL; sg) where
s = q +
1

( + b  )  
1  
q   q
2
; (15)
the board is inuential and target shareholders follow its recommendations.16
(iii) If b 2 b;1 then the bidder o¤ers p1 =  (qH), the board is not inuential, and target
shareholders accept the initial o¤er irrespective of the boards recommendation.
In all cases, the equilibrium of the communication subgame unfolds as described by Proposition
1. In particular, if the initial o¤er is rejected and revised by the bidder on the equilibrium path,
then p1 < p

2.
According to Proposition 2, there are three cases to consider. First, when b 2 [0; b) share-
holders reject the initial o¤er even if the board recommends them to accept it. When the
board is inuential, the bidder su¤ers from adverse selection: The board is recommending the
shareholders to accept the o¤er if and only if it is high enough to compensate the board for the
standalone value of the rm and the loss of its private benets from control. Higher  makes
this problem more severe since a positive recommendation becomes a stronger indication that eq
is lower than expected. The shareholdersfree-riding behavior also magnies this concern since
the bidder can successfully acquire the target only if he pays shareholders at least the value of
the rm under his control. When b is small, the bidder does not have enough private benets
from control to compensate for the expected over-payment, if his o¤er is accepted. The only
way the bidder can avoid losing money is by low-balling the initial o¤er, such that it reects
the negative information about eq that positive recommendations convey. In this equilibrium
the bidder o¤ers p1 <  (qL) < E [eq] + ; however, a low-balled initial o¤er is always rejected
by shareholders.
16If b = b then part (i) holds when      1 
q q
2 and part (ii) holds otherwise.
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Second, when b 2 b;1 the bidder has high intrinsic motivation to acquire the target, and
therefore, he tries to minimize the risk of a failure. Specically, if b is large then the bidder
makes the o¤er attractive to target shareholders such that they nd it optimal to accept it
even if the board recommends them otherwise. To the extent that public rms have a weaker
corporate governance and higher private benets (due to their dispersed ownership structure
and separation between ownership and control), this result is consistent with Bargeron et al.
(2008) and Betton et al. (2009) who nd that relative to private rms, public rms o¤er
higher premiums. The former also nd that the di¤erence is highest when acquisitions by
private rms are compared to acquisitions by public rms with managerial ownership of less
than 1%, and insignicant with managerial ownership in excess of 50%. Interestingly, while
the boards recommendation to reject the takeover o¤er is ignored by shareholders on the
equilibrium path, the bidders initial o¤er is strictly higher than what he would have o¤ered in
the absence of communication, that is, p1 =  (qH) > E [eq]+. Indeed, the possibility that the
target board would alert its shareholders that the o¤er is inadequate is su¢ cient to deter the
bidder from making a low o¤er. This result emphasizes that the board can have an inuence
on the outcome of the takeover even if in equilibrium its recommendations are not followed by
shareholders. In other words, uninformative and ignored recommendations are not evidence
against the ability of the board to a¤ect the outcome of the takeover.
Third, when b 2 (b; b) the equilibrium is a combination of the two scenarios above. On
the one hand, the bidder has enough incentives to acquire the target even though he might
su¤er from adverse selection. On the other hand, the bidder does not have enough incentives
to increase the o¤er and avoid a negative recommendation for sure. As a result, the bidders
initial o¤er is moderateand shareholders follow the recommendations of the board, which
are always informative. Since a recommendation to reject the o¤er increases the risk that
the takeover fails ( < 1), it is a credible signal that the initial o¤er undervalues the target.
Consistent with empirical evidence (e.g., Bates and Becher (2016)), the revised o¤er is higher
than the initial o¤er, p1 < p

2.
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The closed-form of b and b is given by expression (24) in the Appendix. Figure 1 depicts
these cuto¤s as a function of   . The di¤erence b  b measures the inuence of the board
in equilibrium, accounting for its e¤ect on the bidders initial o¤er. Note that b   b obtains
its maximum when   
1 
q q
2
     0. In this range, the balance between the incentives
of shareholders to free-ride and the incentives of the board to inate the revised o¤er results
with the highest alignment of interests between the biased board and target shareholders. Also
note that b   b obtains its minimum when 1 
2 
q q
2
    . In this range the board is not
inuential in equilibrium for all b  0.
Figure 1
3.3. The determinants of the boards inuence
This section describes the e¤ect of various parameters of the model on the ability of the target
board to inuence the decision of its shareholders. For this purpose, I assume that there is an
ex-ante distribution from which the parameters of the model are drawn at the outset of the
game (the formal treatment is given in the Appendix). Under this formulation, the inuence of
the board in equilibrium is probabilistic as it depends on the realization of these parameters.
26
Proposition 3
(i) The probability that target shareholders accept the initial tender o¤er in equilibrium irre-
spective of the recommendation of the board increases in b, decreases in ,  and q   q,
and decreases in  if and only if  < .
(ii) The probability that target shareholders reject the initial tender o¤er in equilibrium irre-
spective of the recommendation of the board decreases in b, increases in ,  and q   q,
and increases in  if and only if  <  + 1 
2 
q q
2
.
According to the analysis in Section 3.2, target shareholders accept the initial tender o¤er
irrespective of the recommendation of the board if condition (14) is violated or b 2 b;1. In
those cases, the board is not inuential on the equilibrium path and its recommendations are
uninformative. These scenarios can be interpreted as instances in which shareholders ignore
a recommendation from their board to reject the initial tender o¤er. According to part (i) of
Proposition 3, the likelihood of these events is higher when the bidder has strong incentives
to minimize the risk of a failure, which is the case when the bidder has signicant private
benets (high b) but he is unlikely to sweeten the initial bid (low ). The likelihood that
shareholders ignore a recommendation to reject the o¤er is also higher when the board has
very little inuence, which is the case when its informational advantage is small (low  or
q   q) or when there is a signicant conict of interest between the board and each individual
target shareholder (high j  j). The latter observation demonstrates that the likelihood that
shareholders follow the recommendations of the board to reject the takeover is non-monotonic
in the boards bias and follows an inverted U-shape.
Similarly, if condition (14) holds and b 2 [0; b) then target shareholders reject the initial
tender o¤er irrespective of the recommendation of the board, which is uninformative. These
scenarios can be interpreted as instances in which shareholders ignore a recommendation from
their board to accept the initial tender o¤er. Part (ii) of Proposition 3 suggests that the
comparative statics is the opposite of part (i). Intuitively, shareholders ignore the board and
27
reject the tender o¤er only if the initial o¤er is low-balled. The bidder low-balls the initial
o¤er when the target board can inuence its shareholders but the bidder does not have enough
incentives to overcome the associated adverse selection. Notice that when the initial o¤er is
doomed to fail, the bidder may refrain from making the o¤er in the rst place. Therefore,
instances in which shareholders ignore accept recommendations and reject the takeover are
less likely to be observed. This is consistent with the ndings of Baker and Savasoglu (2002)
that the proportion of o¤ers that were supported by the target board but failed is less than
a half of the proportion of o¤ers that were resisted by the target board but the target was
eventually taken over by the acquirer.
Proposition 3 generates novel empirical predictions. The interpretation of b, , , q  
q and , which are the independent variables of interest, is described in the setup of the
model.17 A natural proxy for the inuence of the target board is the match between the
outcome of the takeover (success or failure) and the actual recommendation of the board
(accept or reject). Both variables can be directly observed by the econometrician.18 Since
the model predicts that the board inuences the decision of target shareholders if and only
if its recommendation is informative, the inuence of the board can also be measured by the
amount of private information that is revealed by the recommendation itself. The release of
information can be measured by the magnitude (in absolute level) of the abnormal returns of
the targets stock around the time the board publicly issues its recommendation (conditional
on the announcement of the takeover bid), or by a text-based analysis of the details that the
board uses to back its recommendation (as was the case in the takeover of Cadbury by Kraft).
3.4. The market reaction to boards recommendations
Let V  be the expected shareholder value in equilibrium. With rational expectations, the
17Since  and  can be endogenous, new regulations and court rulings that force changes in board structure,
or variations in laws across states and countries, can be used to identify the e¤ect of  and .
18Schedule 14d-9 lings or press releases can be used to identify boards recommendations. Since a takeover
can fail for reasons that are unrelated to the decision of the board or its shareholders (e.g., the bidders failure
to secure funds or clearance from regulators), one has to identify and exclude these cases (e.g., see Malmendier
et al. (2016)).
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market value of the target adjusts to V  at the announcement of the takeover bid. According
to the analysis in Section 3.2, if condition (14) is violated then V  = E [eq] +  and otherwise
V  =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
E [eq] +  if b 2 [0; b)
Pr [ (es)  p1 ] p1 + Pr [ (es) > p1 ] (E [eqj (es) > p1] + ) if b 2 b; b
 (qH) if b 2

b;1 ;
(16)
where p1  (max fqL; sg).
The focus of this section is on the reaction of the market to the recommendations of the
board conditional on the announcement of the takeover bid. Let the market reaction in equi-
librium be r. If condition (14) is violated or b 62 b; b then the board is not inuential
in equilibrium and its recommendations are uninformative. The market correctly anticipates
that shareholders would ignore the board and accept the o¤er if and only if it is higher than
E [eq] + . Since there is no news or surprise, r = 0. If condition (14) holds and b 2 b; b
then p1 = p

1 and the board is inuential in equilibrium. Let r

Accept (r

Reject) be the value of r

following a recommendation of the board to accept (reject) the o¤er. Then
rAccept = p

1   V  = Pr [ (es) > p1 ]H: (17)
rReject = E [eqj (es) > p1 ] +   V  =  Pr [ (es)  p1 ]H (18)
where
H  p1   E [eqj (es) > p1 ]  : (19)
Since rReject and r

Accept have opposite signs, the discussion below only refers to r

Reject.
There are two scenarios. First, if rReject < 0 then p

1 is relatively high and the market
penalizes the target when the board resists the takeover. Shareholders follow the recommenda-
tion of the board to reject the takeover in spite of the negative reaction of the market. Indeed,
because of their free-riding behavior, shareholders cannot avoid rejecting some o¤ers that ben-
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et them collectively. Second, if rReject > 0 then p

1 is relatively low and the market cheers
when the board resists the takeover. Here, the resistance of the board is a credible signal that
the o¤er undervalues the target ( (es) > p1 ) and that a sweeten bid is likely ( > 0).
Proposition 4 Suppose condition (14) holds and b 2 b; b. In equilibrium, rReject < 0 is
more likely than rReject > 0 when ; ; and b are large, or , , and q   q are small.19
Intuitively, the resistance of the board to the takeover is bad news for the target when the
o¤er is rejected to protect the boards private benets from control rather than because the
target is undervalued (large ); when the takeover was likely to generate high synergy or high
value for the bidder (large  and b); when the o¤er was likely to be the bidders best and
nal o¤er(small ); when the target board is not well informed relative to the market (small
 and q   q).
Empirically, the market reacts negatively to announcements of a takeover termination (e.g.,
Malmendier et al. (2016) and the references therein). This evidence suggests that on average
rReject < 0. Typically, however, the reaction of the market to the actual recommendation of
the target board is not directly estimated. One exception is Saeddine and Titman (1999),
who claim that target stock prices declined 3.42% on average as a reaction to an explicit
announcement by the target management that it rejects the o¤er because the price is too low
or inadequate.Among other things, Proposition 4 suggests that these negative reactions are
attributed to a bias of these boards against the takeover. Interestingly, Saeddine and Titman
(1999) also identify a subset of targets which remained independent and outperformed their
benchmarks. Under rational expectations, these targets should have experienced a positive
market reaction to a termination announcement, that is, rReject > 0. Nevertheless, the authors
do not nd such evidence and conclude that the market must have underestimated the extent
to which the values of these rms were improved. Proposition 4 generates novel empirical
predictions about the expected reaction of the market to the recommendations of the board in
19As in Section 3.3, the probabilistic nature of the result reects an ex-ante distribution from which the
parameters of the model are drawn at the outset of the game.
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the cross section, and can be used to interpret existing ndings. The market reaction can be
measured by the sign of the abnormal returns of the targets stock around the announcement
of the boards recommendation.
Finally, let Vpre be the una¤ectedmarket value of the target prior to the arrival of the
bidder. If the market does not expect a takeover to take place, then Vpre = E [eq]. Notice that
V   E [eq], and in this respect, the unexpected announcement of a takeover is always good
news, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. Also notice that E [eqj (es) > p1 ] > E [eq].
Therefore, regardless of the sign of rReject, the market value of the target after the failure of
the takeover remains higher than it was prior to the announcement of the takeover. This
observation is also consistent with the empirical evidence (e.g., Malmendier et al. (2016)).
3.5. Revised recommendations
In the baseline model the board does not issue a new recommendation if the initial o¤er is
revised. Generally, the target board is less likely to inuence the decision of its shareholders
with respect to the revised o¤er. There are two reasons behind this result. First, according to
Proposition 2, if the initial o¤er is rejected by shareholders then the board must have revealed
that es  s for some s 2 [q; q]. Therefore, if a second round of negotiations takes place, target
shareholders (and the bidder) face less uncertainty about eq. According to part (i) of Corollary
1, lower uncertainty weakens the ability of the board to inuence its shareholders. As a result,
if shareholders follow the recommendation of board and reject the initial o¤er, they are less
likely to follow its recommendations with respect the revised o¤er. Second, the revised o¤er
is always the best and nal o¤er(or generally, more likely to be the nal o¤er). Therefore,
unlike the initial o¤er, recommending shareholders to reject the revised o¤er does not have the
benet of convincing the bidder to increase it even further. This e¤ect harms the credibility
of the board since there is no force that mitigates the tendency of the board to undervalue
the target in attempt to overcome the free-riding behavior of target shareholders. For both of
these reasons, the board is less likely to be inuential with respect to the revised o¤er.
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Building on this reasoning, the next result shows that the main conclusions of the analysis
are robust to the possibility that the board would issue a new recommendation with respect
to the revised o¤er.
Proposition 5 Suppose the board can issue a second recommendation after the bidder revises
the initial o¤er but before target shareholders make their nal decision. If
 62 (  q   q
2
; + 
q   q
2
) (20)
then the board is not inuential with respect to the revised o¤er on or o¤ the equilibrium path,
and the equilibrium unfolds as in Section 3.2.
In particular, Proposition 5 implies that if  2 (    1
1 
q q
2
;    q q
2
], which is exactly
to the left of the interval described in (20), then the equilibrium unfolds exactly as described
by Proposition 2: The board a¤ects the initial o¤er or its success, but the board is never
inuential with respect to any revised o¤er.
In the Online Appendix I demonstrate that the analysis of the baseline model also extends
to cases in which  2 (    q q
2
; + 
q q
2
). When  is relatively small, the rejection of the
initial o¤er by the board is a credible signal that the target is undervalued. Therefore, the
residual uncertainty about eq conditional on the rst (negative) recommendation is relatively
small (i.e., s is close to q), and the board cannot inuence the decision of target shareholders
with respect to the revised o¤er. In this case, the second round unfolds as in the baseline
model. However, when  is relatively large, the rejection of the initial o¤er by the board is
mostly attributed to the boards private benets from control rather than the undervaluation of
the target. Therefore, the residual uncertainty following the rst recommendation is relatively
large (i.e., s is distant from q). Di¤erent from the baseline model, in this case the board is
inuential with respect to the revised o¤er, and on the equilibrium path it is possible that the
board changes his recommendation from reject to accept, or keeps it unchanged.
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4. Optimal board structure
In this section I study the optimal structure of the board from the perspective of target share-
holders in the context of takeovers. For this purpose, let V  (; ) be the expected shareholder
value in equilibrium as a function of the bias of the board  and its expertise . The explicit
form of V  (; ) is given in Section 3.4. Similarly, let b (; ) and b (; ) be the cuto¤s from
Proposition 2.
4.1. Optimal board expertise
Let  be the optimal level of expertise for a given level of . If  62 (  1
1 
q q
2
;+
q q
2
) then
condition (14) is violated for any  2 [0; 1], and according to Corollary 1, the expertise of the
board has no e¤ect on the takeover. Since the expertise of the board might still be desired by
shareholders for reasons that are outside of the model, I assume that if arg max2[0;1] V (; )
takes more than one value then  is the maximum of this set. Under this assumption, if
 62 (  1
1 
q q
2
; +
q q
2
) then  = 1. The next result analyzes the complement case.
Proposition 6 Suppose  2 (   1
1 
q q
2
; +
q q
2
). In equilibrium under the optimal board
expertise ( = ) the board is not inuential and target shareholders accept the initial o¤er
irrespective of its recommendation. Moreover,
(i) If  2 (  1
1 
q q
2
;  b
1  ) then 
 2 (0; 1) and condition (14) is violated.
(ii) If  2 (  1
1  maxf
q q
2
; bg; + q q
2
) then condition (14) holds. Moreover:
(a) If b  b (; 1) then  = 1; and if b < b (; 1) then  2 (0; 1) such that b (; ) = b.
(b)  is increasing in  if and only if   .
The closed-form of  is given by expression (58) in the Appendix. Proposition 6 demon-
strates that more expertise on the board does not necessarily benet target shareholders, that
is, V (; ) can decrease in . This result holds even if the boards objective is to maximize
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shareholder value ( = 0). Moreover, under the optimal board structure, the recommendations
of the board are uninformative and ignored by shareholders in equilibrium. This results holds
even if  = 1, i.e., when the optimal board is perfectly informed.
There are two reasons behind this result. First, as the discussion around part (i) of Propo-
sition 2 suggests, target shareholders expose the bidder to adverse selection whenever they
follow the informative recommendations of their board. If b is su¢ ciently small the adverse
selection can result with a low-balled o¤er and a failure of the takeover. Since the takeover
is expected to create value, shareholders end up being worse o¤. Limiting the expertise of
the board is a mean by which shareholders commit to ignoring their board, which mitigates
the adverse selection and encourages the bidder to increase the o¤er. Part (i) of Proposition
6 suggests that even though a fully informed board could a¤ect the outcome of the takeover
(condition (14) holds when  = 1), shareholders are better o¤ with a board that has no e¤ect
whatsoever (setting  < 1 such that condition (14) is violated).
Second, if b is relatively large, the bidder is willing to pay a higher price to avoid a negative
recommendation from the board and guarantee the success of the takeover. Since the takeover
is value increasing, shareholders can extract more surplus if the takeover is likely to succeed.
By limiting the expertise of the board, shareholders e¤ectively commit to accepting o¤ers that
they would have otherwise rejected, thereby incentivizing the bidder to increase the takeover
premium. At the same time, shareholders must ensure that the board has enough private
information so it can credibility warn them when the bidder low-balls the premium. Part (ii.a)
of Proposition 6 shows that the optimal level of expertise accounts for this trade-o¤ by setting
 such that b(; )  b. In this case, the equilibrium unfolds as in part (iii) of Proposition 2.
Part (ii.b) of Proposition 6 shows that  obtains its minimum as a function of  when
 = . Intuitively, according to Corollary 1, if  <  then the credibility of the board
increases with . In this region,  and  substitutes each other. However, if  >  then the
credibility of the board decreases with , and in this region,  and  complements each other.
In other words, the least amount of expertise is needed when the credibility of the board is the
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highest, that is, when  = .
4.2. Optimal board bias
The next result characterizes , the optimal level of board bias (given ).
Proposition 7 Suppose  2 (0; 1]. In equilibrium under the optimal bias ( = ), the board is
not inuential and target shareholders accept the initial o¤er irrespective of its recommendation.
Moreover,
(i) If b  b(; ) then  = ; and if b < b(; ) then  2 (; +  q q
2
) such that
b (; ) = b.
(ii)  is increasing in .
The closed-form of  is given by expression (74) in the Appendix. According to Proposition
7, the highest shareholder value is obtained in equilibrium when the board is biased against
selling the rm. Consistent with this prediction, Bange and Mazzeo (2004) nd that the
takeover premium is higher for targets with non-independent boards, and that if the CEO of
the target is also a board member there is a higher likelihood that the takeover will succeed
and shareholder value will be higher. In both cases, the CEO is likely to use her power over
non-independent directors to resist the takeover and retain her job. Moreover, similar to
Proposition 6, Proposition 7 shows that under the optimal bias, the recommendations of the
board are uninformative and ignored by shareholders in equilibrium.
To understand this result, note that when the board is biased against the takeover, it is
more likely to recommend shareholders to reject the o¤er. If the board is inuential, the bidder
is willing to pay a higher price to avoid a negative recommendation. Therefore, shareholders
can extract more surplus from the bidder if their board is biased against the takeover. A key
question is whether the credibility of the board is diminished by its bias. Without a credible
threat to follow the recommendations of the board and reject lower o¤ers, the bidder has no
incentives to increase the o¤er above  (qH). As was shown in Corollary 1, the credibility of
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this threat can increase with the bias of the board as long as  < . Therefore, it is always
optimal to set the bias of the board at least as high as . In this range, a higher bias not only
increases the resistance of the board, but it also increases its credibility. However, if  > 
then a trade-o¤ emerges: Higher  implies higher resistance but also lower credibility. Part (i)
of Proposition 7 shows that the optimal bias accounts for this trade-o¤ by setting  to be the
lowest value of  above  that satises b(; )  b.
Part (ii) of Proposition 7 shows that  is increasing in . Intuitively, if  is high then
increasing the resistance of the board to the takeover is more important than maintaining its
credibility, which is high in the rst place. This observation implies that if the board structure
is optimized along both dimensions,  and , it is always optimal to have a fully informed
board! This result is in contrast to Proposition 6, which shows that for a xed ,  < 1 can
be optimal. Indeed, as part (ii.b) of Proposition 6 suggests,  increases in  if and only if
  . Since    for a given , it is optimal to choose the highest level of expertise.
Corollary 2 The optimal board structure consists of  = 1 and  2 [; + q q
2
).
4.3. Discussion
Propositions 6 and 7 optimize the board structure along one dimension, while keeping the other
dimension xed. In reality, the characteristics of board members are likely to be correlated.
For example, boards which are populated with insiders who are either employed by the target
rm or have social or business ties with senior management are likely to be both well informed
(access to management) and biased against selling the rm (protecting the CEO). That is, 
and  are positively correlated (at least when  > 0). In this respect, Corollary 2 is reassuring
as it suggests that when both dimensions of the board are considered, it is optimal to have a
well informed board that is biased against selling the rm.
Finally, outside the context of takeovers, the bias of the board and its expertise can have
di¤erent e¤ects on shareholder value. For example, biasing the board away from maximizing
shareholder value can result with distortions in the investment policy of the rm, which could
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a¤ect its standalone value. In this respect, the analysis does not necessarily suggest that it
is always desirable or feasible to design a board with optimal biasand optimal expertise
as described by Propositions 6 and 7. Instead, the analysis emphasizes that in the context of
takeovers, the bias and expertise of the target board have signicant advantages and disadvan-
tages that were previously overlooked.
5. Concluding remarks
Corporate boards can use their information advantage to alert shareholders when a takeover
o¤er is inadequate. This paper studies the advisory role of the board of directors in takeovers.
A unique feature of the model is that the ability of the target board to resist a takeover is
endogenous - the board must convince target shareholders that it is in their best interests to
reject the takeover o¤er. The analysis o¤ers novel predictions about the relationship between
the likelihood that shareholders follow the recommendations of the board and the reaction
of the market to these recommendations, and various characteristics of the acquirer and the
target rm.
In addition, the analysis characterizes the optimal board structure in the context of takeovers.
Under the optimal board structure, directors of the target rm are biased against the takeover.
Perhaps surprisingly, I show that uninformative and ignored recommendations are not neces-
sarily evidence that the target board has no inuence on the outcome of the takeover. In fact,
under the optimal board structure, target shareholders accept the takeover o¤er in equilibrium
irrespective of the recommendations of the board, which are never informative. In other words,
the inability to inuence the decision of target shareholders in equilibrium is a robust feature
of an optimal board structure in takeovers.
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A. Appendix - Proofs of main results
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose q^ (m) +   p1 for all m 2 M (p1). Based on Lemma 1,
1 (m; p1) = 1 for all m 2 M (p1). Therefore, according to Denition 1, the equilibrium is not
inuential. Suppose p1 < q^ (m) +  for all m 2 M (p1). Based on Lemma 1, 1 (m; p1) = 0
for all m 2 M (p1). Thus the equilibrium can be inuential only if  > 0. Based on Lemma
2, the bidder always revises the initial o¤er to q^ (m) + , if he has the opportunity to do so,
and shareholders accept the revised o¤er. However, notice that if this is indeed an equilibrium,
the expected payo¤ of the board is  (q^ (m) + ) + (1  ) (E [eqjes] + ) for all m 2 M (p1).
Therefore, as long as  > 0 the board has strict incentives to send m 2 arg maxm2M(p1) q^ (m)
regardless of the realization of es. This condition implies q^ (m0) = q^ (m00) for all m0 6= m00 2
M (p1), and hence, the equilibrium is not inuential according to Denition 1. Finally, suppose
there are m0 6= m00 2M (p1) such that
q^ (m0) +   p1 < q^ (m00) + : (21)
If this condition holds, it requires q^ (m0) 6= q^ (m00). Therefore, according to Lemma 1,  (m0; p1) =
1 and  (m00; p1) = 0, and the equilibrium is inuential.
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that parts (i) and (ii) follow from Lemma 1, Lemma
2, and the discussion in the main text that follows Lemma 3 up to Proposition 1. Suppose
there exists an inuential equilibrium of the communication subgame. According to Lemma
3 and the discussion that follows this lemma in the main text, the disjoint sets MA (p) and
MR (p) are not empty, and if m 2 MA (p1) then q^ (m) +   p1 and if m 2 MR (p1) then
p1 < q^ (m)+. Moreover, based on (10) the board prefers sendingm 2MA (p) overm 2MR (p)
if and only if (es)  p1. Since these sets are disjoint, non-empty, and their union is M (p1),
it is necessary that (q) < p1 < (q). Moreover, the integration over all m 2 MA (p1) yields
E [eqj(es)  p1]+  p1, and the integration over allm 2MR (p) yields p1 < E [eqj(es) > p1]+.
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The combination of these two conditions yields
E [eqj(es)  p1] +   p1 < E [eqj(es) > p1] + : (22)
Auxiliary Lemma 4 in Appendix B shows that the intersection of (q) < p1 < (q) and
condition (22) is equivalent to the intersection of (q) < p1 and p1 2 [(qL); (qH)), which
proves the argument.
Next, suppose (q) < p1 < (q) and condition (22) hold. Consider an equilibrium of the
communication subgame in which the board sends message mA if (es)  p1 and message
mR 6= mA otherwise. Since (q) < p1 < (q), both messages are on the equilibrium path. Note
that q^ (mA) = E [eqj(es)  p1] and q^ (mR) = E [eqj(es) > p1]. Since (22) holds, q^ (mA) +  
p1 < q^ (mR) + , which according to Lemma 3 implies that the equilibrium is inuential, as
required.
Proof of Corollary 1. Let    q q
2
, I use this notation to ease the exposition throughout
the Appendix. Based on (9) and (13),
(qH)  (qL) = (2  )qH   qL
2
= (2  )
8><>:+ minf

1 +   ; 0g if   
+    if  < :
(23)
It can be veried that (qH) (qL) > 0 if and only if condition (14) holds. Moreover, it follows
directly from the explicit expression of (qH)   (qL) that it increases in , and increases in
   if and only if    < 0. Notice that if 0  
1 +    then (qH)  (qL) decreases
in . If 
1 +    < 0 then @@ [(qH)  (qL)] = (1 )2   (  ) > 0 as required.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose condition (14) holds. I argue the cuto¤s in the statement
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are given by
 
b; b

=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
( maxf0;    + 
1 g ;    + 2 1  ) if   1  <   
(    + 
1  ; (
p
   
q
2 
1 )
2 ) if  <  <  + 1 
2 
(  +
1  ;
 +
1  ) if  +
1 
2    <  + 
(24)
and recall    q q
2
. We start with several observations. First, suppose p1 =  (x) 2
[(qL); (qH)). The board is inuential with respect to this o¤er and the bidders expected
prot is
 (x)  Pr [es  x] (E [eqjes  x] +  + b   (x)) +  Pr [es > x] b (25)
=
x  q
q   q

x+ (1  ) q + q
2
+  + b   (x)

+
q   x
q   q b:
Second, note that s = arg maxx  (x), where s is given by (15). Also note that
 (s) =
1  
4

     
1  + b
2
+ b: (26)
Third, notice that
s < qL , b < y 
     1  
 (27)
s < qH , b < y    j  j+ 2  
1  ; (28)
where condition (14) implies y < y .
There are two cases to consider. First, suppose    
1  <   . In this case, qH = q
and qL = q + 2 maxf0;     1 g. Let  ( (x)) be the expected prot of the bidder as a
40
function of the initial o¤er p1 =  (x). In this case,
 ( (x)) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(q) = b if x < qL
 (x) if qL  x  qH
 (qH)  ( (x)  (qH)) if qH < x
(29)
Indeed, if p1 <  (qL) then p1 < E [eq] +  and the board is not inuential, so the initial o¤er is
rejected for sure and the bidders expected prot is (q). If (qL)  p1 < (qH) then board is
inuential, and by construction, the expected prot of the bidder is  (x). If (qH)  p1 then
E [eq] +  < p1 and the board is not inuential, so the initial o¤er is accepted for sure by the
shareholders and the bidders prot is E [eq] +  + b  p1. Since qH = q, this can be written as
 (qH)   ( (x)  (qH)). Recall s < qL , b < y and s < qH , b < y. Since qH = q and
 (x) is continuous and concave in x 2 [qL; q], we have
x  arg max
x2[q;q]
 ( (x)) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
qL if b  y
s 2 (qL; qH) if y < b < y
qH if y  b:
(30)
Therefore b = y. Note that in this region q < qL ,  + 1  < 0. I argue b =  + 2 1 
and b = maxf0;  + 
1 g. Indeed, if  + 1  < 0 then x  qL > q for all b. Therefore,
the board is inuential for all b 2 [0; y), in which case x = max fs; qLg and b = 0. However, if
 + 
1   0 then qL = q. Therefore, if b  y =  + 1   0 then the initial o¤er fails
for sure, and the board is inuential if and only if b 2 (y; y), in which case x = s > qL = q
and b =    + 
1 .
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Second, suppose  <  <  + . In this case, qL = q, qH = q + 2 (  ) < q, and
 ( (x)) =
8><>: (x) if q  x < qHE [eq] +  + b   (x) if qH  x (31)
We make several observations. First,
 (qH) < E [eq] +  + b   (qH), 0 < b: (32)
Second,
(q) < E [eq] +  + b   (qH), b > y^     + 
1   > 0: (33)
Third,
 (s) < E [q] +  + b   (qH), y3 < b < y4 (34)
where
y3  (
p
   
r
2  
1  )
2 and y4  (
p
   +
r
2  
1  )
2: (35)
Fourth,
y^  y3 < y < y4 (36)
and
 <  +
1  
2  ) y < y^ < y3 (37)
 =  +
1  
2  ) y^ = y = y3 (38)
 >  +
1  
2  ) y^ < y3 < y: (39)
There are two cases:
1. First, if  + 1 
2    then y^  y3 < y < y < y4. Therefore, if b < y^ then s < q
and E [eq] +  + b    (qH) < (q), which implies that x = q is the optimal decision of the
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bidder. In this case the board is not inuential and the initial o¤er fails for sure. If y^  b then
(q)  E [eq] +  + b    (qH). Moreover, since b 2 (y; y) ) b 2 (y3; y4) then s 2 (q; qH) )
(s) < E [eq] +  + b   (qH). This argument implies that x = qH is the optimal decision of
the bidder. In this case, the board is not inuential and the initial o¤er is accepted for sure.
Overall,
x =
8><>:q if b < y^qH if y^  b (40)
and b = b =  +
1  .
2. Second, if  + 1 
2  >  then y < y^ < y3 < y < y4. Therefore, if b < y then s
 < q and
E [eq]++b  (qH) < (q). Therefore, x = q is the optimal decision of the bidder. In this case
the board is not inuential and the initial o¤er fails for sure. If y  b < y3 then s 2 (q; qH)
and E [eq] +  + b   (qH) <  (s). Therefore, x = s is the optimal decision of the bidder.
In this case the board is inuential. If y3  b then either  (s)  E [q] +  + b    (qH) ; or
E [q] +  + b    (qH) <  (s) and qH < s. Since  (qH) < E [eq] +  + b    (qH) always
holds, x = qH is the optimal decision of the bidder. In this case, the board is not inuential
and the initial o¤er is accepted for sure. Overall,
x (b) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
q if b < y
s if y  b < y3
qH if y3  b
(41)
where b =    + 
1  and b = (
p
   
q
2 
1 )
2:
Finally, the proof that p1 < p

2 if the initial o¤er is rejected and revised by the bidder on
the equilibrium path, is given by the auxiliary Lemma 5 in Appendix B.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let    q q
2
. According to Proposition 2, the following hold:
1. The board is not inuential and shareholders accept the initial tender o¤er if either
43
     
1  ; or    1  <  <  +  and b 2

b;1, or  +   . In those cases,
shareholders ignore a recommendation from the board to reject the o¤er. Denote these
events by  = i.
2. The board is not inuential and shareholders reject the initial tender o¤er if   
1  <
 <  + and b 2 [0; b). In those cases, shareholders ignore a recommendation from the
board to accept the o¤er. Denote these events by  = ii.
Suppose that at the outset of the game, each parameter of the model, denoted by  2  
fb; ; ; ;g, is drawn by nature from a distribution F (where the parameters are subject
to all the constraints I specify in the setup of the model, e.g.,  > 0). Suppose also the
parameters of the model are independent of each other. The independence of parameters is
essential for deriving of the comparative statics which by denition requires holding every else
equal. Notice that condition (14) and cuto¤s b and b, as given by expression (24) in the proof
of Proposition 2, depend on the value of . Part (i) is a statement about how Pr [ = ij]
changes with , where the probability is taken with respect to the joint distribution of n fg.
Similarly, part (ii) is a statement about how Pr [ = iij] changes with .
The comparative statics with respect to b follows directly from the two observations above.
Consider the comparative statics with respect to . Suppose condition (14) holds. According
to expression (24), b () increases with  if and only if  < , and b () increases with  if and
only if  <  + 1 
2 . This argument concludes the e¤ect of . The proof of the comparative
statics with respect to  and  is more involved and can be found in auxiliary Lemma 6 in
Appendix B.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Notice that H > 0 if and only if
p1 > E [eqj (es) > p1 ] + ,
(max fqL; sg) > E [eqjes > max fqL; sg] + ,0@  (E [eqjes > max fqL; sg] + )
+ (1  ) (E [eqjes = max fqL; sg] + )
1A > E [eqjes > max fqL; sg] + ,
E [eqjes = max fqL; sg] +  > E [eqjes > max fqL; sg],
E [eqjeq = max fqL; sg] +  > E [eqjeq > max fqL; sg],
max fqL; sg > q   2= (42)
Based on (15) and (13), this condition holds if and only if
max

   ;  
1   ;
 + b+ 
2
  1
2
2  
1  

> 0; (43)
and recall    q q
2
. The statement follows directly from this expression. In auxiliary Lemma
7 in Appendix B I show that the statement is not empty, that is, there is a conguration of
parameters such that H > 0 and a conguration such that H < 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. I prove that if  62 (  q q
2
;+
q q
2
) then the there is no revised
o¤er with respect to which the target board is inuential. If true, the analysis of Proposition
2 applies in this range. For this purpose, let m1 be the boards message with respect to initial
o¤er p1. Also let 1 (m1; p1) be the resulted decision of target shareholders and p2 (m1) the
revised o¤er that follows this message if the initial o¤er is rejected.
Suppose m1 is uninformative about eq. If the initial o¤er is revised then the continuation of
the game unfolds as in the baseline model with the exception that  = 0. Applying Proposition
1 and Corollary 1 for the special case  = 0, implies that if  62 (   q q
2
; + 
q q
2
) then the
board can never inuence the decision of target shareholders at the continuation of the game.
Suppose m1 is informative about eq. We proceed in several steps. First, I argue that there
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is s 2 [q; q] such that if es  s then m1 satises 1 (m1; p1) = 0 and if es < s then m1
satises 1 (m1; p1) = 1. To see why, suppose that the initial o¤er is rejected. If the bidder
does not revise the initial o¤er then the boards payo¤ is E [eqjes] + . If the bidder revises the
initial o¤er and the board is not inuential with respect to the revised o¤er then its payo¤
is either p2 (m1) if the revised o¤er is accepted or E [eqjes] +  if it is rejected. If the bidder
revises the initial o¤er and the board is inuential with respect to the revised o¤er then the
boards payo¤ is max fp2 (m1) ;E [eqjes] + g. Either way, conditional on message m1 and the
rejection of the initial o¤er, the boards payo¤, denoted by R (m1; es), is strictly increasing ines. If 1 (m01; p1) = 1 (m001; p1) for all m01 6= m001 then the board chooses m1 2 arg maxm p2 (m),
and therefore, message m1 cannot be informative about eq, a contradiction. Therefore, there
exist m01 6= m001 such that 1 (m01; p1) = 0 and 1 (m001; p1) = 1. The board prefers message m01
over m001 if and only if p1  R (m01; es). Moreover, since  > 0, if the board sends message m01
such that 1 (m
0
1; p1) = 0, then it has to be that m
0
1 2 arg maxm12fm:1(m;p1)=0gR (m1; es). Since
R (m1; es) is increasing in es, so is maxm12fm:1(m;p1)=0gR (m1; es). Therefore, there is s 2 [q; q]
as required.
Second, suppose on the contrary that the board is inuential with respect to the revised
o¤er p2 (m1). The board will send a message that results with an approval if and only if
p2 (m1)  E [eqjes] + . If p2 (m1) < E [eqjes = s] +  then the board always has incentives to
send a message that leads to the rejection of the revised o¤er. If p2 (m1)  E [eqjes = q] + 
then the board always has incentives to send a message that leads to the approval of the
revised o¤er. In both cases, the board cannot be inuential with respect to p2 (m1). Suppose
E [eqjes = s] +   p2 (m1) < E [eqjes = q] + , which is equivalent to
s + (1  )E [eq] +   p2 (m1) < q + (1  )E [eq] + : (44)
If the board is inuential then, similar to the proof of Proposition 1, integration over all (second
round) messages that result with a rejection of the revised o¤er and all messages that result
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with an approval of the revised o¤er require
E
eqjs  es < p2 (m1)  (1  )E [eq]  


 p2 (m1)  < E
eqjp2 (m1)  (1  )E [eq]  

 es ;
(45)
which is equivalent to
s + (1  )E [eq] + 2    p2 (m1) < q + (1  ) [eq] + 2  : (46)
The intersection of conditions (44) and (46) is non-empty if and only if  2 (   q s
2
; +
 q s

2
). However, the combination of s 2 [q; q] and  62 (    q q
2
; + 
q q
2
) implies  62
(   q s
2
; +  q s

2
). Therefore, the board cannot be inuential with respect to o¤er p2, a
contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let    q q
2
, and note that according to (9) and (13)
 (qH) = E [eq] +  + + (2  ) min f0;  g+ (1  ) : (47)
Case I: Suppose   . If     
1  then V () = E [eq] + , and if   1  <    then
V () is given by (16). Based on (47) and Lemma 8 in Appendix B,
V () = E [eq] +  +
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1  )  if 
1     
+ (1  )  if    < 
1  and b  b
 2 if    < 1  <  b  and b 2

b; b

 1 if maxf  ;  b  g < 1  and b 2

b; b

0 if    < 
1  and b < b;
(48)
where  1 and  2 are given by (103) and (104). Substituting b and b with their explicit form
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as reected by (24), V () can be rewritten as
V () = E [eq] +  +
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1  )  if 
1     
+ (1  )  if    < 
1    +b2 
 2 if maxf  ;  +b2  g < 1  < minf +b ;   b g
 1 if maxf  ;  +b2  ;   b g < 1    +b
0 if maxf  ;  +b

g < 
1 
(49)
Note that maxf  ;   b

g <  +b

and
   < (>) b
1   )
     b

< (>)    < (>)    + b
2   (50)
There are two cases to consider. First, if    < b
1  then
V () = E [eq] +  +
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(1  )  if 
1     
+ (1  )  if    < 
1    +b2 
 1 if
 +b
2  <

1    +b
0 if  +b

< 
1  :
(51)
Note that 
1  =     )  + (1  )  = (1  ) . Also note that according to Lemma 8,
 1 is decreasing in  in the relevant range, and that if

1  =
 +b
2  then E [eq] +  +  +
(1  )  =  1. Therefore, the optimal  requires 1  = minf 11 
q q
2
;  +b
2  g, which implies
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 = minf1;  +b
2 
1 
q q
2
g. Second, if     b
1  then
V () = E [eq] +  +
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(1  )  if 
1     
 2 if    < 1     b
 1 if
  b

< 
1    +b
0 if  +b

< 
1  :
(52)
Note that according to Lemma 8, both  1 and  2 are decreasing in  in the relevant range.
Also note that 
1  =     )  2 = (1  )  and 1  =   b )  2 =  1. Therefore, the
optimal  requires 

1  = minf 11 
q q
2
;  g, which implies  = minf1;  
1
1 
q q
2
g.
Case II: Suppose  > . If  +    then V () = E [eq] + , and if  <  <  +  then V
is given by (16). Based on (47) and Lemma 8
V () = E [eq] +  +
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(1  )  if     
+ (2  )    if    <  and b  b
 1 if    <  and b 2

b; b

0 if    <  and b < b;
(53)
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where  1 is given by (103). Substituting b and b with their explicit form, then
V () = E [eq]++
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
(1  )  if     
+ (2  )   
if    <   minfb (1  ) +   ; 2 
1  (  )g
or 2 
1  (  ) <  < 1 2  (
p
b+
p
  )2
 1
if maxf  ; 2 
1  (  ) ; 1 2  (
p
b+
p
  )2g <
  (1  )  +b

0
if maxf  ; b (1  ) +   g <   2 
1  (  )
or maxf2 
1  (  ) ; (1  )  +b g < :
(54)
Note that    < minf2 
1  (  ) ; b (1  ) +   g and
 
(1 )2 < b) 2 1  (  ) < minf(1  )  +b ; 1 2  (
p
b+
p
  )2; b (1  ) +   g
 
(1 )2 > b) 2 1  (  ) > maxf(1  )  +b ; 1 2  (
p
b+
p
  )2; b (1  ) +   g
(55)
There are two cases to consider. First, if  
(1 )2 < b then
V () = E [eq] +  +
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(1  )  if     
+ (2  )    if    <  < 1 
2  (
p
b+
p
  )2
 1 if
1 
2  (
p
b+
p
  )2 <   (1  )  +b

0 if (1  )  +b

< ;
(56)
Note that  =    )  + (1  )  > (1  ) . Also note that according to Lemma 8,  1
is decreasing in  in the relevant range, and that if  = 1 
2  (
p
b+
p
  )2 then E [eq] +  +
 + (1  )  >  1. Therefore, the optimal  requires  = minf q q2 ; 1 2  (
p
b +
p
  )2g,
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which implies  = minf1; (
p
b+
p
 )2
2 
1 
q q
2
g. Second, if  
(1 )2  b then
V () = E [eq] +  +
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(1  )  if     
+ (2  )    if    <   b (1  ) +   
0 if b (1  ) +    < ;
(57)
Here it is straight forward to see that  = minf1; b(1 )+ q q
2
g.
Summary: Overall,  = minf1; Lg where
L =
2 (1  )
q   q 
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
   if     b
1 
b+ 
2  if   b1  <   
(
p
b+
p
 )2
2  if  <    + b (1  )2
b+  
1  if  + b (1  )2 < :
(58)
The comparative statics that is described in the main text follow directly from the explicit
expression of . To prove parts (i) and (ii) we consider four subcases.
1. If  62 (  1
1  maxf
q q
2
; bg; + q q
2
) then condition (14) is violated for all  2 [0; 1]. If
 2 (  1
1 
q q
2
;  b
1  ) then 
 =  
1
1 
q q
2
< 1.
2. Suppose  2 (   1
1  maxf
q q
2
; bg;]. In this range, b () =     + 2 
1 
q q
2
and
 = minf1; b+ 
2 
1 
q q
2
g. Thus,  < 1 if and only if b < b (; 1). If b < b (; 1) then by
construction b = b (; ) and     1
1 
q q
2
<  ,    b
1  < . If b  b (; 1) then
 = 1 and clearly   1
1 
q q
2
< .
3. Suppose  2 (; + minfb (1  )2 ; q q
2
g). Since  <  + b (1  )2 implies  
1 
2 
q q
2
<
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(
p
b+
p
 )2
2 
1 
q q
2
,  <  +  1 
2 
q q
2
<  + 
q q
2
and condition (14) holds. Moreover,
 < 1, b <
 r
2  
1  
q   q
2
 
p
  
!2
= b (; 1) : (59)
If  = 1 then b  b (; 1), and if  < 1 then b = b (; ), as required.
4. Suppose  2 ( + b (1  )2 ; + q q
2
). Since  >  + b (1  )2 implies  
1 
2 
q q
2
>
b(1 )+ 
q q
2
,  +  1 
2 
q q
2
<  <  + 
q q
2
and condition (14) holds. Moreover,
 < 1, b <    +
q q
2
1   = b (; 1) : (60)
If  = 1 then b  b (; 1), and if  < 1 then b = b (; ).
Proof of Proposition 7. Let    q q
2
. If  62 (   
1  ; + ) then the board is never
inuential and the target shareholder value is E [eq] + . We show that for any b there is
 2 (  
1  ; + ) that generates a strictly higher expected shareholder value.
Suppose b  2 
1 . Based on (24), b  b for all . Therefore, according to (16),
V () =  (qH) = q + (1  )
q + q
2
+
8><>:2   if  <  <  +  + (1  )  if   
1  <   ;
(61)
which obtains its maximum at  = . Since V () > E [eq] + ,  =  as required.
Next, suppose b < 2 
1 . Based on based (24), b() =
2 
1 , b( + ) = 0 and b () is a
decreasing function of  when  2 [; + ]. Therefore, there is  2 (; + ) such that
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b() = b. Based on (24),
 =  +
8><>:  (1  ) b if b <
1
1 
1
2 
(
q
2 
1  
p
b)2 if 1
1 
1
2   b < 2 1 
(62)
I argue that if b < 2 
1  then 
 = . There are several steps. First, since V
 


=
(qH)j= > E [eq] + , choosing  62 (   1  ; + ) is suboptimal. Also, choosing  such
that b < b(), which yields V = E [eq] + , cannot be optimal.
Second, dene ^ <  such that b(^) = b. Based on (24),
^ =   2  
1  + b: (63)
Note that ^ >   
1  if and only if b > . We argue that if  < b <
2 
1  then V
 


> V (^).
If true, choosing    such that b  b() is never optimal. There are two sub-cases. First, if
maxf; 1
1 
1
2 g < b < 2 1  then V
 


> V (^) if and only if (qH)j= > (qH)j=^, which
holds if and only if
2   >  + (1  ) ^ ,
 
 r
2  
1   
p
b
!2
>  + (1  )

  2  
1  + b

,
  2p
p
(2  ) (1  ) b+ b (2  ) (1  ) < (1  )2 ,p
(2  ) (1  ) b p
2
< (1  )2 ,
b <
2  
1  
which always holds in this range. Second, if  < b < 1
1 
1
2  then V
 


> V (^) if and only if
2   >  + (1  ) ^ ,  < 1; (64)
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which always holds, as required.
Third, I show that if b < 2 
1  and  is such that b()  b < b() then V (; b) < V
 
; b

.
If true, this argument completes the proof that b < 2 
1  )  = . Notice that based on
(24), b()  b < b() implies  <  + 1 
2 . Consider two sub-cases:
Case I: Suppose   
1  <  <  +
1 
2 . In this case, qL < s
 and V () =  1 () where
 1 () is given by (103) in Lemma 8. Since b() is an increasing function of  in this range,
b()  b implies b(   
1 )  b. Notice that  1 () is concave in  and arg max  1 () =
  
1 . Therefore, if b < b(  1 ) then
V (  
1  ) =  1( 

1  ) >  1 () = V () (65)
and  2 (  
1 ; +
1 
2 ) is suboptimal. Suppose b(  1 )  b. Since b < b(), then
^ as dened by (63) satises b(^) = b,   
1   ^ < , and V (^) = q+ (1  )
q+q
2
+  +
(1  ) ^ =  (^). But notice that  1(^) >  1() = V (). We conclude that   1  <  <
 + 1 
2  cannot be optimal.
Case II: Suppose   
1  <     1 . Note that  in this range can be optimal only if
the following two conditions hold:
1. First, we require
^ <   
1  , b < 2 : (66)
Otherwise, since b < b() , ^ < , any ^ <  satises   
1  < . Therefore,
 1 () <  1(^), but since  1(^) < V
 


, choosing     
1  cannot be optimal.
2. Second, we require
  
1    b <  

1  ,  < b: (67)
Otherwise, since qL < s ,    1    b < , qL < s implies   1  <  and
 1 () <  1(   1    b). However, if s  qL then  1 () =  2 (), where  2 () is
given by (104). It can be veried that    
1  <  implies  2 () < E [eq] + . Since
54
 =    
1    b ) s = qL, we have V (   1    b) < E [eq] + . However, since
E [eq] +  < V (), choosing     
1  cannot be optimal.
The intersection of the two conditions above requires
 < b < 2 ; (68)
and note that this condition implies   
1  <   1 . If condition (68) holds and b  11  12 
then  1(  1 ) < V
 


if and only if
E [eq] +  + 1  

( + b)2
4
< q + (1  ) q + q
2
+ 2   , (69)
b < 4  (70)
which holds if condition (68) holds. Thus,  is optimal. Suppose condition (68) holds and
1
1 
1
2  < b <
2 
1 . Since 2  < 2 1 , we require
maxf; 1
1  
1
2  g < b < 2 : (71)
In this range,  1(  1 ) < V
 


if and only if
E [eq] +  + 1  

( + b)2
4
< q + (1  ) q + q
2
+ 2   , (72)
1  

( + b)2
4
+
 r
2  
1   
p
b
!2
< +  (1  ) (73)
Note that the LHS is the convex in b. Therefore, it is su¢ cient to check that the inequality
holds at the end-points, that is, when b = 2   and when b = 1
1 
1
2 . In the latter case,
V
 


= q + (1  ) q+q
2
     (  b (1  )), which we have shown above to be greater
than  1(  1 ), therefore, the inequality holds. If b = 2    then ^ =   1 . Therefore,
 (  
1 ) =  1(^) = q + (1  )
q+q
2
+  + (1  ) ^ < V  . In both cases,  is optimal,
55
as required.
Summary: Overall
 =  +
8>>>>><>>>>>:
  (1  ) b if b < 1
1 
1
2 
(
q
2 
1  
p
b)2 if 1
1 
1
2   b < 2 1 
0 if 2 
1   b:
(74)
The comparative statics of  follows directly from (74).
Proof of Corollary 2. According to the proof of Proposition 6, if  =  then V =  (qH) =
+ E [eq] + 2  , where  =  q q
2
. Since  increases in , shareholder value is maximized
by  = 1.
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